more pertinent. During the crisis, the euro effectively shielded Members of the EMU from the turbulences that proved so costly in times of stress in the past. But at the same time, we must recognise that the single currency is not a solution to all economic woes. The opportunity to learn from the lessons of this crisis and prepare a strategy that will strengthen Europe's response to any future adverse economic shocks is of utmost importance for all of us, and in particular for the New Member States, as many of them still face the challenge of adopting the single currency.
There are reasons to be optimistic about the near-term outlook. Financial conditions have improved over the summer, with several financial indicators returning to pre-crisis levels. Business and consumer confidence indicators have also improved in recent months. World trade has stabilised, and there are indications that the destocking cycle is bottoming out. The relative resilience of consumption has proved to be a stabilising factor during the recession, as disinflation and relief measures included in fiscal stimulus packages have supported household incomes.
According to our latest forecasts, which were published at the beginning of the month, the EU and the euro-area economy are emerging from recession in the second half of this year. In the EU and the euro area, annual growth rates are expected to be 0.7% in 2010 and gathering pace, at around 1.5% in 2011.
However, I should stress that uncertainty about the strength and sustainability of the recovery remains. Banks are in the process of strengthening their solvency ratios, helped by the accommodative stance of monetary policy and rescue packages. But the stabilisation in financial markets has yet to yield concrete outcomes for credit distribution to the economy. Moreover, deteriorating employment prospects are a huge source of concern which we need to address.
The role of the euro
Ten years after the inception of the euro, the crisis has put the single currency to a major test. But far from withering, the euro has weathered the storm well.
First, and most importantly, the euro prevented exchange rate and interest rate turbulences among the euro-area Member States. We know Third, since the start of the financial turmoil, the European Central Bank has skilfully managed liquidity and aggressively lowered interest to record low levels. This has helped to ease conditions in the interbank market and to anchor inflation expectations throughout this period of uncertainty.
Finally, but not of least importance, the governance structure of EMU, -again, far from being perfect -facilitated the coordination of policy action across the euro area and the European Union as a whole.
Imagine for a moment, how the crisis could have unfolded without the euro. The coordination problems would have multiplied. 16 European central banks would have had to struggle for a coordinated liquidity provision while trying to keep exchange rates and inflation expectations in check, or engage in negotiations about currency swaps.
Why then, after ten years of successful EMU, did the crisis hit so hard the euro area? The single currency in itself is no panacea. The crisis has highlighted the unfinished business in the euro area. As argued by the Commission in our Report on EMU@10 last year, unfinished business relates in particular to (i) the accumulation of intra euro-area imbalances; (ii) the lack of a pan-European cross-border financial supervision and crisis management framework, and (iii) euro-area governance. Let me take a few minutes to go through these three challenges.
Because of important macroeconomic imbalances accumulated over time, some euro-area countries have been hit particularly hard. One group of countries have been running very large and persistent current account deficits and have registered a sharp deterioration in their net foreign asset positions. These external deficits reflect the strength of private domestic demand compounded by losses in price competitiveness due to an inappropriate response of wages to productivity growth. At the same time private sector debt has increased rapidly and external funding has tended to be channelled excessively into housing and consumption, contributing to the emergence of housing bubbles.
How to correct these imbalances? Taking measures to downsize and adjust oversized sectors, including in particular housing, is part of the answer. It is also necessary to reduce high private sector debt and adjust unsustainable intra-euro area current account imbalances. Countries with entrenched current account deficits should restore competitiveness. Finally, the crisis showed that the established mechanism of policy coordination within the euro area was not working sufficiently well.
Indeed, if co-ordination had started earlier and had been more comprehensive, the aggregate impact of the euro-area economic policy response could have been stronger. Co-ordination matters for the EU as a whole, but it is particularly important for euro-area Member States.
More than ever, the euro area should exert leadership in these testing times. The timing, intensity and sequencing of policy withdrawal require our attention. To be successful in this process, close co-ordination among all actors will be needed to ensure optimal cross-country differentiation but also cross-policy consistency.
The need for coordinated exit strategies
In the euro area, coordination requirements are particularly strong, given extraordinary macroeconomic and financial support measures. We agreed to cooperate and coordinate, accordingly.
CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) and SEE (South Eastern Europe) countries and the crisis

New Member States (NMS) from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
were badly hit by the crisis, following a sharp decline of global demand and retrenchment of capital inflows.
Many of them fell into sharp recessions and their fiscal positions deteriorated markedly. However, the recession and financial strains were and remain stronger in those countries which already at the onset of the crisis had been suffering from major imbalances or policy weaknesses. total commitments under the facility to 14.6 billion euro. In view of the increasing needs, the ceiling of available EU assistance has been raised in two steps from 12 to 50 billion euro. This assistance is provided in the context of broader international support packages, implying an unprecedented degree of co-operation with the IMF and the close involvement of other actors (MDBs, bilaterals).
In conjunction with the accompanying policy programmes, the international assistance has contributed to stabilising market expectations and underpinning confidence. BoP assistance has given the three countries breathing room to implement reforms necessary to restore access to private external financing and, ultimately, to honour their external debt obligations. Assistance also contributed to prevent a larger recession in the three countries. By providing significant financing to the budget, the programmes have allowed greater operation of automatic stabilisers than would have been possible otherwise. This has helped limit the social effects of the crisis. Importantly, the assistance is providing an opportunity to adopt long-due structural reforms in the countries concerned. More recently, the financial market situation in the NMS has improved.
However, we should not have illusions on the pace of recovery. Even assuming continued forceful policy actions, the recovery is expected to be gradual. Some economies in the region are constrained in the use of fiscal stimulus. The scope for CEE countries to benefit from an export-led recovery is limited. Potential growth in the region is also unlikely to return to pre-crisis trends in the short term.
Policy challenges for the CEE countries remain significant. What is of key importance in the short term is to maintain resilience in view of persistent macro-financial vulnerabilities. Banking sectors continue to face important risks given the ongoing deterioration of asset quality.
From a medium-term perspective, it is important to address further accumulated imbalances and re-establish a robust and sustainable growth and convergence path. This will require continued efforts particularly in the fiscal and structural fields.
New Member States, in their efforts to accelerate the catching-up process, have acquired over the years an important capacity to adjust . I am confident that in the face of the current challenge this capacity to adjust will prove invaluable.
Oesterreichische Nationalbank's Conference on European Economic Integration 2009 Presentation by Commissioner Almunia The Euro's Contribution to Economic Stability in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe
11/20
Before concluding, let me say a few words about the situation in candidate and potential candidate countries, where the crisis has so far been felt to different extents.
Some of those countries, particularly the most integrated in international trade and capital flows, felt the impact of the crisis more quickly and more severely and will post negative growth this year. Let me note that the banking sector in pre-accession countries has weathered the crisis remarkably well, thanks to its high degree of capitalisation and liquidity, and -in the case of Turkey -due to a strong round of previous reforms.
Only one ailing bank needed to be rescued, in Montenegro.
However, and in spite of fiscal adjustment measures taken in these countries, my main concern over the short-and medium-term relates to the continued deterioration of the fiscal situation.
The EU stands ready to help candidate and potential candidate countries in difficulty. EU macro-financial assistance can be provided, in conjunction with IMF programmes, to support them through the worst of the crisis. Earlier this year Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed programmes with the IMF. This in turn played an important role in enabling EU-based parent banks maintain their financial exposure to these two countries. The EU will also contribute to these efforts. The
Commission recently proposed two macro-financial assistance loans in favour of Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of EUR 200 and 100 million respectively. These loans remain to be approved by the Council and the Parliament. Serbia also benefits in this context from exceptional EC budget support assistance expected to be released this year and in Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude on the EU members that are not yet integrated in the euro area.
2010.
Euro attractiveness
The fall-out of the crisis -including the reappraisal of risk, tighter financing and liquidity conditions, and exchange rate volatility -has brought euro-area membership to the forefront. The exit strategy will serve these countries in their preparation for euro adoption.
Among countries with pegged exchange rate regimes, the crisis has reinforced the prevailing euro-adoption strategies. Euro-area membership is perceived as a credible exit strategy propping up confidence (by residents and non-residents alike) in the pegs. Euro adoption is seen as offering a relief to liquidity constraints and eliminating exchange rate mismatches while not imposing additional challenges to economic policies.
For countries with floating exchange rates, the crisis has highlighted the vulnerabilities coming from large fiscal deficits against the background of tighter global conditions. Euro adoption should not be seen as a quick fix to economic vulnerabilities. It should rather be part of a broader long-term policy strategy. As the crisis has amply demonstrated, membership in the euro area enhances resilience, but it does not eliminate the need to work out underlying imbalances that have been built up over the last years. Also, new entrants need to prepare thoroughly to cope with life under an irrevocably fixed exchange rate in order to successfully perform within the euro area. 
